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Introduction 
The idea of a heckler’s veto over disfavored speech has been familiar 
for more than half a century.1 Roughly put, the heckler’s veto doctrine 
holds that opponents of a speaker should not be permitted to suppress 
the speech in question through their own threatened or actual violence.2 
As it turns out, though, the meaning, status, and scope of the idea of a 
heckler’s veto are today surprisingly far from clear.3 Part II considers 
the relevant case law. Part III discusses related events and commentary. 
This Article concludes that American legal culture is unlikely to arrive 
at any consensual resolution of many of the conflicts and uncertainties 
 
†  Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney 
School of Law.  
1. See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949) (holding that 
an ordinance outlawing speech that “stirred people to anger” was 
unconstitutional), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308–11 (1940) 
(overturning a conviction for speech criticizing religion that offended listeners 
as “unduly suppress[ing] free communication of views . . . under the guise of 
conserving desirable conditions”). 
2. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4–5, (holding that that a conviction resting on the 
grounds that defendant’s speech “invited public dispute” could not stand). See 
infra Sections II–III for numerous concurring authorities. For one recent case 
discussion, see Bible Believers v. Wayne County, 805 F.3d 228, 252–55 (6th Cir. 
2015) (en banc) (reversing conviction of anti-Islamic proselytizing at an Arab 
Festival and holding that the local police effectuated a heckler’s veto by failing 
to quall the crowds or protect the speakers). 
3. See infra Parts II–III (describing the state of the heckler’s veto in the law and 
in the context of the American education system).  
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in question. Understanding why no such consensual resolution of basic 
heckler’s veto questions is likely to shed light on the nature of contem- 
porary legal and political controversies more generally. The Conclusion 
below focuses in particular on the broad contemporary phenomenon of 
what might be called reduced forensic confidence. 
If the status, scope, and meaning of the heckler’s veto are indeed 
irreconcilably contested, there is probably no entirely neutral grounds 
on which to begin any analysis. Merely for the sake of setting this in-
quiry in motion, however, this Article begins with some provisional 
understandings of the basic idea. Typically, the possibility of a heckler’s 
veto arises when there is, in one context or another, three elements: 1) 
a potential or actual speaker; 2) an audience, at least part of which is 
somehow hostile to the speaker or the speech; and 3) some actual or 
potential police or other security presence.4 The possible variations on 
these three elements, and their interactions, are numerous. 
One respected vision of how these elements of speaker, hostile 
audience members, and police may generate heckler’s veto scenarios is 
that of the distinguished constitutional scholar Harry Kalven, Jr.5 
Professor Kalven discusses the idea of a heckler’s veto most extensively 
in the context of a particular Supreme Court case that seems to accom- 
modate, rather than disallow, a heckler’s veto.6 On Professor Kalven’s 
account, the basic heckler’s veto problem arises when the underlying 
speech, to which the presumed heckler objects, does not involve invid- 
ious epithets or what the law refers to as “fighting words.”7 The 
underlying speech is in itself legally permissible. In a heckler’s veto case, 
“[t]he risk of disorder arises because the audience, or some of it, does 
not like what the [speaker] is saying and wishes to stop it.”8 
 
4. For one variety of this general triadic scenario, see Terminiello v. City of 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1949), in which the Court applied the doctrine of the 
heckler’s veto to a speaker in an auditorium, protected by police, while a large 
protest formed outside. 
5. See Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition 89–105 (1988) (analyzing 
the classic heckler’s veto cases and freedom of speech in the context of what he 
calls the civil rights cases—Edwards v. South Carolina, Cox v. Louisiana, and 
Gregory v. Chicago). 
6. Id. at 89–92. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (upholding a 
conviction of a speaker where police believed the speech was stirring the crowd 
to violence). 
7. Kalven, supra note 5, at 89. The classic ‘fighting words’ case is Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Chaplinsky allows the prohibition of words 
“which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace.” Id. at 572. The ideas of injury, and perhaps even of 
incitement, are unclear and contestable in the context of fighting words as well 
as in heckler’s veto cases. 
8. Kalven, supra note 5, at 89–90. 
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Professor Kalven indicates that “[i]n the abstract, if the state did 
not like what [the underlying speaker] was saying, it would be powerless 
to silence him. In [the heckler’s veto] situation, however, it can claim 
neutrality.”9 He then elaborates, pointing to what he takes to be a key 
dynamic of the heckler’s veto situation: 
[B]y giving the police wide discretion to stop the speaker because 
of audience hostility, the state . . . in effect transfers the power of 
censorship to the crowd. Moreover, the police are likely to share 
the views of the angry audience; hence, their perception of the 
unrest may be colored by their assessment of the speaker’s 
message.10 
Professor Kalven’s account offers a tentative mainstream account of the 
most basic nature of a heckler’s veto, and some of its implications. 
For the sake of slightly greater convenience, this Article might focus 
as well on a simpler formulation of the idea of a heckler’s veto. Thus 
very roughly, “[a] heckler’s veto is the suppression of speech by the gov- 
ernment . . . because of the possibility of a violent reaction by 
hecklers.”11 The analysis below will involve an unpacking and critique 
of these basic mainstream formulations of the idea of a heckler’s veto, 
as it illustrates the fracturing and fragmentation of the superficially 
clear idea of a heckler’s veto. 
I. Classic Case Law Understandings of the Heckler’s 
Veto 
The historic case law of the meaning, scope, and status of the 
heckler’s veto has itself displayed a number of important conflicts and 
uncertainties. Below, this Part briefly considers some of the more note 
worthy judicial markers in the evolution of heckler’s veto doctrine.12 
 
9. Id. at 90. 
10. Id. 
11. Brett G. Johnson, The Heckler’s Veto: Using First Amendment Theory and 
Jurisprudence to Understand Current Audience Reactions Against 
Controversial Speech, 21 Comm. L. & Pol’y 175, 180 (2016) (quotations 
omitted). But cf. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) 
(raising the possibility of a heckler’s veto over speech uttered by the government 
itself). See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Richard Spencer’s Right to Speak at Auburn, 
N.Y. Times (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/opinion/ 
richard-spencers-right-to-speak-at-auburn.html [https://perma.cc/QX3J-UZ49] 
(defining the heckler’s veto). 
12. These instances do not exhaust all the significant cases that might be considered 
to be heckler’s veto cases and not all of these cases need be universally 
recognized as raising genuine heckler’s veto issues. 
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For the sake of not pre-judging any important analytical issues—and 
for a sense of the doctrinal development over time—these cases are 
taken up in chronological order. 
This Article could begin the historical exposition at any number of 
points, but the 1940 case of Cantwell v. Connecticut13 provides an in-
stance in which speech in what is called a traditional public forum,14 is 
constitutionally protected despite the distinctly hostile reaction of the 
two relevant listeners to the speech in question.15 Cantwell’s two 
initially consensual listeners to his anti-religious and anti-Catholic 
speech “were in fact highly offended.”16 In this instance, offense at least 
momentarily threatened to transition into physical violence against the 
speaker.17 Thus one of the two hearers “said he felt like hitting Cantwell 
and the other that he was tempted to throw Cantwell off the street.”18 
Cantwell’s speech was in the end constitutionally protected, largely 
on the theory that even explicit criticism of a listener’s own religion 
should not count as unprotected “abusive remarks directed to the 
person of the hearer.”19 The Court in Cantwell found an intent to 
persuade, and an absence of any personal epithets20 or intentional dis-
courtesy21 on the speaker’s part. If there is any “abuse” in Cantwell’s 
speech, it is thought to operate at the level of abstract, generalized 
religious belief, as supposedly distinct from anything that would count 
as personal, or identity-threatening, abuse.22 
 
13. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
14. Traditional public fora typically include government-owned streets, sidewalks, 
and parks open to a remarkably broad range of speakers and subjects. See, e.g., 
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015) 
(holding that Texas’s specialty license plates do not fall into the public forum 
framework); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 
45–46 (1980) (holding that teacher mailboxes are not public fora like streets 
and parks). As will become evident, not all speech subject to a heckler’s veto 
need take place in a traditional public forum, or any other form of government-
owned property. 
15. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308–10 (holding that inflammatory criticism of 
organized religion on a public street was protected speech). 
16. Id. at 308–09. 
17. See id. at 309 (noting that the offended listeners wanted to hit the speaker). 
18. Id. No altercation took place, apparently because the speaker agreed to leave 
the scene. Id. 
19. Id. See also id. at 310 (finding speaker only made an “effort to persuade”). 
20. Id. at 309–10. 
21. Id. at 310. 
22. See id. (finding that the speaker merely intended to persuade other people of 
what he thought was “true religion”). Compare id. with Chaplinsky v. New 
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The sense that hostile audience reactions to offensive speech should, 
generally, not legitimize the arrest or other forms of censorship of the 
speaker was then reinforced in Terminiello v. City of Chicago.23 
Terminiello involved indoor speech to a primarily, but not entirely, 
supportive audience of about 800,24 with about 1,000 protestors outside 
the auditorium.25 The police were not able to prevent several distur-
bances,26 and the speaker was convicted of a breach of the peace.27 
The Court in Terminiello noted that under the breach of the peace 
statute, as authoritatively construed, the speaker could have been con-
victed “if his speech stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or 
brought about a condition of unrest.”28 The Court ruled this instruction 
constitutionally impermissible.29 In now-classic terms, the Court de-
clared that 
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to 
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it 
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with 
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is 
often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and 
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses 
for acceptance of an idea.30 
As bracing as this language may be, it is unclear how concretely 
descriptive of the circumstances in Terminiello it really is. Generally, 
the protesters outside the hall did not hear, and thus could not have 
 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (discussing the supposedly more 
personally directed insulting epithets and intentional offense).  
23. 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
24. Id. at 2–3. 
25. Id. at 3. 
26. Id. This illustrates the point that a heckler’s veto situation has both a positive 
and a negative dimension. Police may have both a positive obligation to 
control an audience, or to protect speech, and a negative obligation to not 
arrest the speaker, or otherwise suppress the underlying speech. See Cheryl 
A. Leanza, Heckler’s Veto Case Law As a Resource for Democratic Discourse, 
37 Hofstra L. Rev. 1305, 1306 (2007) (“Heckler’s veto cases justify 
compelling (and prohibiting) state action”). 
27. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 3. 
28. Id. at 5. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 4. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017 
The Heckler's Veto Today 
164 
been reacting to, any words uttered inside by Terminiello.31 The disrup-
tive and disorderly conduct of the protesters outside the auditorium 
was clearly inspired by Terminiello’s pre-existing reputation and by his 
language on other occasions, and was well underway long before 
Terminiello even began to speak.32 In any event, the Terminiello Court 
sheds little light on issues of permissible provocation, agitation, precip-
itation, or inducement of a response, and on punishable direct incite-
ment of a criminal response to speech.33 
Nor is it clear that the Court’s bracing references to the “high 
purpose”34 of free speech, or the value of attacking “prejudices and 
preconceptions,”35 relates especially well to much of Terminiello’s actual 
language, which involved a combination of antisemitism and recourse 
to epithets36 such as “‘slimy scum,’ ‘snakes,’ ‘bedbugs,’ and the like.”37 
It would be entirely reasonable to think of Terminiello’s literally de-
humanizing, if rhetorical, references as something other than an 
attempt to persuade through candid and mutually responsive dialogue. 
Nor is the belief, at a literalist level, that one is not reducible to slimy 
scum, or to a snake, or to a bedbug, reasonably characterizable as a 
“prejudice[] or preconception[]”38 of which one might be disabused 
through persuasive speech. 
Finally, one might note that the bracing rhetoric39 of the 
Terminiello opinion may not seem equally appropriate in all speech 
contexts, or even in all sorts of public fora.40 At a minimum, it must be 
separately argued that the rhetoric of the Terminiello opinion should 
apply to public university contexts, where a range of distinctive values 
 
31. See id. at 8 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (noting that those outside did not hear 
the speech). 
32. See id. at 14–16 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (observing that the protests had begun 
even as the speaker arrived). 
33. For historic background, see the attempted distinction by Judge Learned Hand 
in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y), rev’d, 246 F. 24 
(2d Cir. 1917). Judge Hand’s distinction in Masses was constitutionally restored 
in the subversive advocacy case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 
(1969). 
34. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 20–22, 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
37. Id. at 26. 
38. Id. at 4. 
39. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
40. See supra note 14 (citing authorities that explore the public forum doctrine). 
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are potentially at stake.41 It is far from clear whether the logic and the 
rhetoric of the Terminiello opinion should typically apply to public 
elementary and high school speech that might well evoke a hostile audi-
ence response.42 
Less than two years after deciding Terminiello, the Court 
reconsidered the interests at stake in the context of heckler’s veto cases 
in Feiner v. New York.43 Feiner involved speech promoting a forth-
coming meeting and criticizing national and local public officials and 
organizations, with a general substantive speech theme of racial equal 
rights.44 Feiner’s oration, delivered on a public sidewalk, resulted in his 
disorderly conduct conviction,45 ultimately upheld by a divided 
Supreme Court.46 
Feiner’s speech had drawn a crowd of approximately 75 to 80 
listeners, of mixed sympathies, with a police presence consisting of two 
officers.47 The crowd presence on the sidewalk and street required some 
passing pedestrians to use the street.48 Perhaps more crucially, “[t]he 
crowd [became] restless and there was some pushing, shoving and 
milling around.”49 Having refused several police requests to cease 
speaking, Feiner was arrested for inciting a potential breach of the 
peace.50 The Court emphasized the motivation of the arresting officers. 
In particular, the officers “were motivated . . . by a proper concern for 
the preservation of order and protection of the general welfare, 
 
41. See generally R. George Wright, Campus Speech and the Functions of the 
University, 43 J.C. & U.L. 1 (2017) (explaining the various potentially 
conflicting purposes underlying the institution of the modern university 
campus). 
42. Consider the distinctive value of elementary student speech that stirs other 
elementary school students to anger. But see generally Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 
4 (extolling speech that incites anger). For a discussion of political speech and 
what is thought to be offensive speech in public school contexts, see infra 
Section III.A. 
43. 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
44. Id. at 317. 
45. Id. at 316–18. 
46. The major dissent was authored by Justice Hugo Black. Id. at 321 (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
47. Id. at 316–17 (majority opinion). 
48. Id. at 317. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 318. 
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and . . . there was no evidence . . . that the acts of the police were a 
cover for suppression of petitioner’s views and opinions.”51 
Feiner’s arrest was thus said to reflect not police or other official 
disapproval of the content or message of his speech,52 but instead, 
listener physical reaction to the speech in question.53 The Court 
concluded that “[w]hen clear and present danger of riot, disorder, inter-
ference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat 
to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to 
prevent or punish is obvious.”54 
There is much to be said in response to the logic of Feiner. Justice 
Black’s dissenting opinion—anticipating an eventual scholarly conclu-
sion of Professor Kalven55—notes some of the strategic incentives 
established by the majority opinion.56 Thus Justice Black observes that 
“[t]he end result . . . is to approve a simple and readily available 
technique by which cities and states can with impunity subject all 
speeches, political or otherwise . . . to the supervision and censorship of 
the local police.”57 
In heckler’s veto contexts, the various strategic incentive effects of 
the possible rules are indeed crucial. But it should be emphasized that 
heckler’s veto cases are not limited to those cases in which some official 
authority is itself hostile, or even vaguely unsympathetic, to any mes-
sage content of the underlying speaker. The often more interesting 
heckler’s veto cases are those in which the official authority is neutral 
toward—or even sympathetic with—the content of underlying speaker’s 
 
51. Id. at 319. See also id. at 321 (noting that three New York courts approved the 
way in which the police chose to “preserve peace and order”). 
52. Id. at 319–20. Actually, we can think of the crowd spilling out onto the public 
street, thereby inconveniencing or endangering pedestrians or vehicle traffic, as 
more or less content-neutral grounds for restricting the speech. Crowd 
restlessness or disagreement can be considered content-based grounds for 
restricting the speech, even if the police and other public officials themselves 
had no objection to the content of the speech. See generally R. George Wright, 
Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of 
a Common Distinction, 60 U. Miami L. Rev. 333, 364 (2006) (discussing the 
muddy and arbitrary nature of jurisprudence on the distinction between 
content-based and content-neutral actions). 
53. See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 320. 
54. Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)). 
55. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
56. See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321–29 (Black, J., dissenting). 
57. Id. at 323. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017 
The Heckler's Veto Today 
167 
message, but opts, due to third-party manipulation, to reduce the 
perceived risk of violence by somehow silencing the speaker.58 
The Feiner majority was reluctant to second guess on-the-scene 
choices among alternative police responses to actual or potential 
disorder, undertaken in the uncertainties of the moment.59 What Feiner 
misses in this regard is that in typical heckler’s veto cases, there will 
systematically be advantages of cost, convenience, simplicity, and 
conflict avoidance in simply taking the underlying speaker into involun-
tary custody, whether prosecution of the speaker follows or not. These 
systematic advantages are independent of the innocence of the speaker. 
In other contexts, the Court has recognized that short-term 
considerations of cost, convenience, and simplicity may systematically 
outweigh more important long-term values in the minds of local decision 
makers.60 In such cases, the governing legal rules should take proper 
account of these systematic biases toward choices that may not reflect 
the overall, long-term public interest.61 In the Feiner case, only the 
dissenting justices showed much interest in a legal presumption that 
official silencing of an innocent speaker should be a last resort, under-
taken only after all realistic possibilities of controlling disruptive audi-
ence behavior have been exhausted.62 
Courts in general might choose to disagree with the Feiner majority 
on the doctrinal boundaries of illegal incitement, or on constitutionally 
mandated presumptions and priorities in maintaining public order. But 
it is also possible in this often fact-sensitive area to merely distinguish 
the circumstances of Feiner, perhaps through exaggerating the gravity 
of the threat to public order therein.63 Later Supreme Court cases have 
often drawn upon some mixture of both strategies. 
 
58. After all, the phenomenon under scrutiny is referred to as that of a heckler’s 
veto, rather than as a police veto. 
59. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 319–20. 
60. See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411–13 (1971) 
(noting the systematic biases in favor of routing new highway construction 
through parkland already owned by the public at the eventual cost of 
insufficient remaining parkland, and recognizing a statutory requirement of the 
local government’s exhaustion of less environmentally damaging alternatives). 
61. See id. at 413 (“If the statutes [concerning how to select the location of a 
highway] are to have any meaning, the Secretary cannot approve the 
destruction of parkland unless he finds that alternative routes present unique 
problems.”). 
62. See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 326–27 (Black, J., dissenting) (describing a similar 
presumption and prioritization among all possible police responses); see also id. 
at 330–31 (Douglas & Minton, JJ., dissenting). 
63. See, for example, the classic civil rights case of Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 
U.S. 229, 235–37 (1963), in which the Court noted that the threat to the public 
order in Feiner was more substantial than under the circumstances of Edwards 
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Thus the case Cox v. Louisiana64 refers to a tense and jeering but 
non-threatening “small” crowd of onlookers, with 75 to 80 armed police 
officers interposing themselves between civil rights demonstrators and 
the largely hostile group of onlookers.65 Cox also declares that 
“constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to 
their assertion or exercise.”66 The problem is that hostility to speech is 
often not simple,67 or mere hostility; 68 there may as well be some degree 
of potential or actual crowd violence and disorder. 
“Mere” audience hostility, thus, presents only the relatively easy 
cases. The more difficult cases begin with arrested or otherwise censored 
speakers whose opponents credibly threatened or engaged in “unruly” 
behavior, or otherwise jeopardized the public order.69 The relatively 
speech-protective cases, following Terminiello,70 choose to protect 
speech by legally innocent speakers, at least as against some limited 
degree of otherwise controllable disorderliness on the part of hostile 
onlookers.71 Degrees of potential violence, and the degree of greater or 
lesser controllability of such violence by less speech-restrictive means, 
will in many cases be fairly debatable. 
This brief survey of some of the classic Supreme Court cases 
provides an initial sense of some of the basic features of heckler’s veto 
scenarios. Not surprisingly, though, many of the most interesting dis-
putes over the nature, status, and scope of a heckler’s veto arise outside 
the context of Supreme Court cases. The Part below turns to some 
 
given the absence of any threats of violence, and the presence of ample police 
protection. 
64. 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
65. Id. at 550. See also id. at 551 (analogizing the circumstances in this case to 
those in Edwards and seeking to distinguish Feiner); supra note 63 and 
accompanying text. 
66. Cox, 379 U.S. at 551 (quoting Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535). 
67. See, e.g., Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992) 
(noting that “[s]peech cannot be . . . punished or banned, simply because it 
might offend a hostile mob”). 
68. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir. 1978) (“[M]ere public 
intolerance or animosity cannot be the basis for abridgement 
of . . . constitutional freedoms.” (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 
611, 615 (1971)). 
69. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111–12 (1969). 
70. See supra notes 23–42 and accompanying text. 
71. See, e.g., Gregory, 394 U.S at 111–13. The Gregory case did not specify whether 
taking the speaker into protective custody would be constitutionally 
impermissible if that course of action were deemed genuinely necessary to 
prevent some greater likelihood or greater severity of violence and disorder on 
the part of hostile onlookers. 
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recent lower-court cases that raise—even though they do not satis-
factorily resolve—important issues bearing upon the idea of a heckler’s 
veto. 
II. The Nature and Scope of the Heckler’s Veto: Some 
Emerging Judicial Issues 
Recent case law has explored heckler’s veto scenarios in which any 
form of legal absolutism—whether of speakers’ rights or of public 
safety—may seem misplaced. One recent case, Bible Believers v. Wayne 
County,72 recognizes that particular circumstances may constrain famil-
iar doctrine and any simplistic responses in heckler’s veto cases. 
The Bible Believers en banc majority recognized that what it judged 
to be an unconstitutional heckler’s veto could indeed be “reimagined 
and repackaged”73 as the protection of members of the public, or even 
the protection of the underlying speaker, from impending physical 
harm.74 The majority avoided an unrealistic absolutism by prioritizing, 
but only presumptively, the ability to speak. Thus “before removing 
the speaker due to safety concerns, . . . the police must first make bona 
fide efforts to protect the speaker from the crowd’s hostility by other, 
less restrictive means.”75 Any police restriction of otherwise legitimate 
speech was then held to be properly subjected to a familiar consti-
tutional test of strict scrutiny, under which the police may advance 
compelling public safety ends “by using only those means that are the 
least restrictive with respect to the speaker’s First Amendment 
rights.”76 
Significantly, the Bible Believers court recognized that there are 
circumstances in which a police restriction of otherwise protected 
speech may pass the strict scrutiny test. Thus, for example, if over-
whelmed police officers “must retreat due to risk of injury, then retreat 
would be warranted.”77 One problem, though, is that the number of 
police officers on the scene may itself reflect political biases and prior 
official strategic calculation. Officially, disfavored speakers cannot gen-
erally be charged fees in proportion to the supposed likelihood of hostile 
 
72. 805 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). This case involved a Christian group’s 
proselytizing at a large annual Arab International Festival focusing on cultural 
exchange. The Festival was open to the general public on temporarily closed 
public streets of Dearborn, Michigan. Id. at 234–35. 
73. Id. at 255. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 253. 
77. Id. 
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onlooker outbursts.78 But local authorities could, on the other hand, 
consciously provide inadequate numbers of crowd-control officers, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of disorder, and the likelihood that 
censoring the underlying speaker will then seem reasonably necessary 
to preserve public safety. Many official judgments as to such necessity—
unavoidably dependent upon speculation as to the likely effectiveness 
of alternative police responses—will be readily contestable. 
An important further complication involves the relationship be-
tween a heckler’s veto and the broad legal category known as content-
based restrictions on speech.79 It is often thought that all content-based 
restrictions on political speech should be tested by judicial strict scru-
tiny,80 quite apart from whether the circumstances involve any threat 
to public safety. It is also often thought that all heckler’s veto cases 
involve content-based restrictions on speech.81 Whether a heckler’s veto 
of speech should be tested by strict scrutiny may thus depend on how 
narrowly or broadly content-based restrictions of speech are defined. 
The problem with classifying all heckler’s veto cases as involving 
content-based restrictions on the underlying speech is that any such 
broad generalizations ignore arguably relevant differences in official 
motives. Some heckler’s veto cases involve hostility to the underlying 
speech on the part of some audience members along with active or pas-
sive hostility of the relevant government officials.82 Government dis-
approval of the ideas subjected to a heckler’s veto, where the gov-
ernment is motivated in some degree by its own disapproval of the 
 
78. See generally Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–36. 
79. See generally Wright, supra note 52; R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and 
Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A Distinction That Is No Longer Worth 
the Fuss, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 2081 (2015). 
80. While the precise contours and limits of the majority opinion are unclear, this 
is the general thrust of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27 
(2015). 
81. See, e.g., Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 
780, 787 (9th Cir. 2008) (“If the statute . . . would allow or disallow speech 
depending on the reaction of the audience, then the ordinance would run afoul 
of an independent species of prohibitions on content-restrictive regulations, 
often described as a First Amendment-based ban on the ‘heckler’s veto’.”); 
Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 200 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A heckler’s 
veto is an impermissible content-based restriction on speech where the speech 
is prohibited due to an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction of the 
audience.”); Rosenbaum v. City & Cty. of S.F., 484 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir. 
2007)( A ‘‘heckler’s veto’’ is an impermissible content-based speech restriction 
where the speaker is silenced due to an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction 
of the audience.). 
82. Consider, for example, that a hypothetical early 1960s civil rights march focused 
on the injustice of officially endorsed public policies. 
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underlying speech, would present a relatively clear case of a content-
based restriction of speech.83 
But not all heckler’s veto cases need involve any government dis-
approval of the underlying speech. The courts often hold that audience 
reaction—as distinct from any official reaction84—to the underlying 
speech is crucial to heckler’s veto cases.85 On this basis, one could easily 
argue that a heckler’s veto case could involve the government’s com-
plete ignorance of, indifference to, or even support of the message of the 
underlying speaker. 
Imagine a case in which the relevant government strongly supports 
the underlying message, as when a speaker wishes to endorse the re-
election of the incumbent officials. With great reluctance, the govern-
ment restricts this favored message because of its inability to control a 
hostile audience of such speech. The government’s restriction of the 
speech could be classified as content-based, but at the price of ignoring 
that the government’s views and the speaker’s views are in perfect 
alignment. 
A heckler’s veto case could also be thought of as one in which the 
government is completely unware of the content of the speaker’s mes-
sage, but must restrict the speech in question in order to prevent or 
minimize bystander injuries. Society might wish to apply strict scrutiny 
in some, or all, such cases. But one could also sensibly say that such 
speech restrictions are content-based only in a very broad and extended 
sense, in which government disapproval, or awareness, of the message 
is entirely absent.86 
 
83. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226–27 (discussing the requirement of content-
neutrality and categories of content-based laws that require strict scrutiny). 
84. Of course, sufficient police or other governmental action or inaction is necessary 
for a classic heckler’s veto case. An audience’s physical attack on the speaker 
would presumably silence the speech, amounting to a literal and direct heckler’s 
veto. But classic heckler’s veto cases involve First Amendment-based challenges 
to official action or inaction, and thus require sufficient state action. For 
background on the state action requirement, see, for example, Marsh v. 
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that in a corporation-owned town the 
corporation cannot restrict fundamental liberties and enforce this restriction by 
application of a state statute). 
85. See, e.g., Santa Monica Nativity Scenes Comm. v. City of Santa Monica, 784 
F.3d 1286, 1293 (9th Cir. 2015) (referring to the “listeners’ actual or anticipated 
hostility”); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 533 F.3d at 787 (allowing or 
disallowing speech “depending on the reaction of the audience”); Startzell, 533 
F.3d at 200 (stating that a heckler’s veto occurs “where the speech is prohibited 
due to an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction of the audience”); 
Rosenbaum, 484 F.3d at 1158 (stating that a heckler’s veto occurs “where the 
speaker is silenced due to an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction of the 
audience”). 
86. For an example of a court’s unwillingness to apply heckler’s veto doctrine in 
the absence of any police knowledge of, agreement with, or disagreement with 
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The nature, status, and limits of a heckler’s veto—and of proper 
judicial responses thereto—are contestable in other basic respects as 
well. It is, for example, unclear whether the idea of a heckler’s veto 
should be extended to cover subconscious government motivations and 
decisions well in advance of the speech in question.87 There is no present 
audience at the time of such decisions, and no audience, hostile or other-
wise, may ultimately form. 
Relatedly, it is also debatable whether a heckler’s veto can be 
imposed through a broad, standing legislative enactment, as opposed to 
a narrower restriction on particular instances of speech.88 Legislative 
heckler’s vetoes might thus be imposed years in advance of any relevant 
speech. As well, one might argue that the heckler’s veto doctrine should 
apply not only to pure speech,89 and to symbolic speech or to mixed 
speech and conduct,90 but as well to the politically controversial exercise 
of one’s constitutional rights through pure conduct.91 
The scope of the heckler’s veto doctrine has also been variously 
contested in contexts of government, as opposed to private party, 
speech;92 an individual’s refusal to pay a government assessment aimed 
 
the message of either the speaker or the speaker’s opponents, see Rosenbaum, 
484 F.3d at 1159 (explaining that there is no heckler’s veto if there is no 
evidence of official awareness of or response to anyone’s views, as distinct from 
merely an unacceptable noise level). 
87. See e.g., Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–36, 
(analyzing speech permit fees imposed well in advance of any speech or reaction 
thereto by any future audience). 
88. Compare Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining 
that most heckler’s vetoes are imposed legislatively, and in response to 
“majority sensibilities,” as distinct from administratively, and in response to 
“the sensibilities of a minority”) with Santa Monica Nativity Scenes, 784 F.3d 
at 1293–94 (discussing repeated efforts to confine the scope of heckler’s veto 
cases to restriction of particular speakers or of particular speech). Of course, 
who counts as a “majority” or as a “minority” in heckler’s veto cases will often 
be subject to dispute, depending partly on the breadth of what one takes to be 
the relevant background population or background circumstances. 
89. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949) (discussing the fact 
that freedom of speech, without action, that provokes a negative response may 
still be protected under the First Amendment). 
90. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (analyzing whether 
burning a draft card is a protected form of symbolic speech). 
91. See, e.g., Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 795-96 (8th Cir. 2008), (discussing 
whether protesters picketing in front of a Planned Parenthood office constituted 
a heckler’s veto of protected conduct). 
92. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (quoting 
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., 
dissenting))(“To govern, government has to say something, and a First 
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at an industry’s well-being;93 children’s misperceptions of otherwise ap-
propriate government accommodation of religion94 or of indecent 
Internet speech;95 and in the case of an employer’s racial discrimination 
in order to accommodate racial prejudices in the labor force.96 The sheer 
variety of putative heckler’s veto cases is thus remarkable. 
The aim herein is not to take sides on any of the above unresolved 
issues as to the nature, status, and scope of the heckler’s veto, or on 
the proper judicial responses to heckler’s veto cases. This Article’s aim 
is instead to document such unresolved conflicts,97 and then to suggest 
that the United States  is unlikely to arrive at any consensual resolution 
of many of the most significant such conflicts, and to explain the con-
sensual, unsolvable nature of such conflicts.98 Progress toward achieving 
these aims can best be made by attending to important putative 
heckler’s veto issues in various more or less concrete and familiar edu-
cational contexts. Part III thus examines contested understandings of 
the idea of a heckler’s veto in public education cases immediately below. 
III. The Heckler’s Veto in the American Educational 
System 
A. The Public School Context 
The image of a well-functioning public school classroom may seem 
distant from the violence, disorder, and threats to public safety mani-
fested in the classic heckler’s veto case of Terminiello.99 But the leading 
 
Amendment heckler’s veto of any forced contribution to raising the 
government’s voice in the ‘marketplace of ideas’ would be out of the question.”). 
93. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 468 (considering the necessity of some form of 
government speech inevitably supported in some way by taxes or exactions). 
94. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (referring 
to a possible “modified heckler’s veto . . . on the basis of what the youngest 
members of the audience might misperceive”). 
95. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997) (striking down the federal 
Communications Decency Act). 
96. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798 (1998) (opining on the 
hypothetical situation in which an employer might discriminate in job 
assignments in deference to prejudice amongst the employees). Even more 
broadly, it has been said that “any lawsuit that stops the government from 
doing something that the majority wants can be labeled a ‘heckler’s veto.’” 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Church and State Should Be Separate, 49 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 2193, 2213 (2008). 
97. See infra Part III. 
98. See infra notes 161–175 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra notes 23–42 and accompanying text. 
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public school free speech case, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District,100 explicitly links these two contexts. 
The Tinker case involved a black armband Vietnam War protest 
by high school students.101 The Court held that even in the public high 
school context, mere “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur-
bance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”102 
Similarly, “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness 
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint”103 will not suffice to 
restrict such speech.104 More concrete evidence that the restricted speech 
would “materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school”105 is instead 
required.106 Otherwise put, school officials must have “reason to 
anticipate”107 that the speech to be restricted “would substantially in-
terfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other 
students.”108 
Of special interest for the purposes of this Article is the Tinker 
Court’s explicit reference to the heckler’s veto logic of Terminiello. The 
Tinker Court declares in particular: 
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, 
that deviates from the views of another person may start an 
argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we 
must take this risk . . . and our history says that it is this sort of 
hazardous freedom . . . that is the basis of our national 
strength . . . in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, 
society.109 
As for the requirement that we take the risk in question, the Tinker 
Court cites the heckler’s veto case of Terminiello.110 
 
100. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
101. Id. at 504. 
102. Id. at 508. 
103. Id. at 509. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. (quotation omitted). 
106. See id. (finding no such interference in Tinker). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. The nature, scope, and necessary weight of any such rights were 
understandably left unspecified in Tinker. 
109. Id. at 508–09. 
110. Id. at 508. The Tinker Court did not specify any particular passages from the 
Terminiello opinion. 
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The anticipated reaction to the black-armband protest in Tinker 
presumably fell short of a Terminiello-like rock-throwing mob. Thus, 
the Tinker Court need not have embraced Terminiello to the fullest 
extent. It is clear that the Tinker standards regarding student speech 
actually fall short of protecting otherwise appropriate student speech 
as against imminent or actual rock-throwing.111 
What is less clear, however, is whether Tinker always protects 
otherwise permissible school speech against less extreme forms of what 
might be considered an attempted heckler’s veto. Hostile reaction to 
actual or anticipated speech need not take the form of violent rock-
throwing. It has been judicially held in non-school contexts that there 
is no exception in the case of an audience of minors from the general 
rule against judicially validating a heckler’s veto.112 In the public school 
case law, though, the permissibility of what is claimed to be a heckler’s 
veto has been vigorously disputed.113 
Thus in the student-speech context, it has been argued that “the 
government cannot silence a speaker because of how an audience might 
react to the speech,”114 and that this principle is simply the heckler’s 
veto doctrine.115 The choice is said to be between ignoring possible 
audience reactions to speech and permitting “the will of the mob to rule 
our schools.”116 
 
111. See supra notes 102–108 and accompanying text (describing the requirements 
of Tinker and noting that permitting actual rock-throwing in a school 
environment presumably would be disruptive and interfere with the normal 
disciplinary processes of the school). 
112. See Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sherrif Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 
790 (declining to create a minors exception to the heckler’s veto when anti-
abortion activists displayed images of aborted fetuses across from a middle 
school). 
113. See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 766–67 (9th Cir. 
2014) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing 
that in allowing the heckler’s veto in schools, the majority “creates a split with 
the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits and permits the will of the mob to rule our 
schools”). See also Katherine M. Portner, Tinker’s Timeless Teaching: Why the 
Heckler’s Veto Should Not Be Allowed in Public Schools, 86 Miss. L.J. 409 
(2017) (discussing the circuit split on the heckler’s veto in the context of public 
schools). 
114. Dariano, 767 F.3d at 766 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. More generally, the O’Scannlain dissent relies on Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie 
School District, 636 F.3d 874, 876 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting the otherwise realistic 
incentives with regard to offensive speech), and Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. 
Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1259, 1294–95 (11th Cir. 2004) (protecting the symbolic 
speech of holding up a fist rather than reciting the Pledge of Allegiance). See 
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It is of course possible to argue that there are intermediate 
alternatives between ignoring possible audience responses, regardless of 
their likelihood, severity, motivation, degree of calculation, or reason-
ableness, and incentivizing mob rule and the intimidation of innocent 
speakers. On the other hand, most relevant school speech cases actually 
do not seem to be especially interested in whether school authorities 
have explored, or have reasonably exhausted, the possibilities of avoid-
ing violence by warning, reasonably deterring, or somehow restraining 
potential opponents of the speech in question.117 There are, for example, 
a number of appellate cases involving the wearing or display of 
Confederate flag regalia in public schools.118 Most such cases do not 
seem to require that school officials exhaust all realistic possibilities of 
deterring audience violence before restricting the underlying speech.119 
The Confederate flag cases may well illustrate the limits to a full-
fledged speech-protective heckler’s veto doctrine in the public school 
speech context. Tinker itself does not seem to require that the school 
explore the effectiveness of, say, temporarily reassigning supervisory 
administrative staff where there may be a substantial risk of disruption 
by counter-protesters. Nor, one might argue, should the law require 
such steps. For one thing, Tinker allows for student speech restrictions 
not merely given the likelihood of substantial disruption,120 but also to 
prevent violation of the rights of other students.121 One thus might well 
 
Dariano, 767 F.3d at 771–72 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
117. See supra notes 60–62; Dariano, 767 F.3d at 768 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The panel claims that the source of the 
threatened violence is irrelevant: apparently requiring school officials to stop 
the source of a threat is too burdensome when a more ‘readily-available’ solution 
is at hand . . . namely, silencing the target of the threat.”). 
118. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 438 (4th Cir. 2013); DeFoe ex 
rel. DeFoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 335–36 (6th Cir. 2010); A.M. ex rel. McAllum 
v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 222–23 (5th Cir. 2009); B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. 
Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 739 (8th Cir. 2009); Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 566–67 
(6th Cir. 2008); Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cty., 324 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th 
Cir. 2003); Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cty., 218 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 
2000); West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000). 
119. See supra note 118. 
120. See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Again, the Tinker Court 
understandably did not undertake an analysis of which sorts of rights-claims 
might suffice in such cases. For limited further discussion, see Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274–76 (1988), in which the Court focused on 
family and personal privacy rights, and did not require a more narrowly-tailored 
alternative restriction than simply refusing to print the two newspaper articles 
in question. 
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argue for a public school student’s right against the officially approved 
display, by one’s fellow students, of Confederate flag images. 
If, however, one were to find no such right, it is still unclear that 
Tinker would uphold a student speech right to display a Confederate 
flag. The scope of reasonable adverse reactions by students to such 
displays may not be confinable to mere discomfort or displeasure.122 
Fundamental dignity concerns are not exhausted by considerations of 
mere discomfort or mere displeasure. Evocation of the Confederacy, in 
these public school contexts, may provoke more than abstract disagree-
ment, and the emotions associated with mere abstract disagreements.123 
Not all significant student audience reactions to such displays may be 
visible. Crucially, even in the absence of any likely violent response, 
such displays may, in Tinker’s language, “substantially interfere with 
the work of the school.”124 The work of the school, after all, involves 
allowing all students to equally concentrate, without distraction, on 
basic educational matters, and on inculcating responsible citizenship in 
a pluralistic society. 
One might wonder about the permissible display of Confederate 
flags in schools in which there are relatively few minorities. But there 
is something perverse about more stringently protecting speech that 
distinctly targets groups who are too clearly outnumbered to be physi-
cally disruptive. One might explain this in terms of some relevant right 
of the outnumbered targeted group.125 But it is again equally arguable 
that prohibiting typical Confederate flag clothing displays meets 
Tinker’s requirements by preventing interference with the work of the 
schools.126 
The important tasks assigned to public schools are multiple, and 
not always fully compatible.127 The work of the public schools, for 
Tinker’s purposes, is arguably broad. Even as of the time of Brown v. 
 
122. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
123. For the underexplored idea of words which by their very utterance inflict 
judicially cognizable injury, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 
572 (1942). Presumably, the point of excepting words “which by their very 
utterance inflict injury,” is to cover cases in which the target of the speech is 
not likely under the circumstances to respond violently. Id. 
124. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
125. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
126. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (listing cases addressing school bans 
on clothing with the Confederate flag and the requirement from Tinker that 
the ban prevents speech that “substantially interfere[s] with the work of the 
school”). 
127. See generally R. George Wright, Post-Tinker, 10 Stan. J.C.R. & C.L. 1 
(2014) (discussing the various purposes and values of schools and how “Tinker-
protected speech” may serve some purposes while negating other values). 
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Board of Education,128 the Court had recognized the importance of pub-
lic school education to the construction and maintenance of a function-
ing democratic society.129 In the language of Brown, education “is a 
principle instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in pre-
paring [the child] for later professional training, and in helping [the 
child] to adjust normally to [the child’s] environment.”130 Presumably, 
this applies equally to all public school students. 
 It is certainly arguable that, at a minimum, a public school could 
prohibit typical displays of Confederate flags. Whatever the consciously 
intended meanings of such displays, they could be interpreted as 
interfering with the basic socialization functions of the schools. On this 
view, such displays could reasonably be said to substantially interfere 
with the work of the school,131 even, and indeed especially, if minority 
representation at the particular school is quite limited. In such cases, 
one might well argue that Tinker’s requirements for restricting speech—
even on the basis of the speech’s content132—have been met. 
On this possible analysis, typical restrictions on student speech in 
schools aimed at protecting the school’s ability to carry out one or more 
of its basic functions would not reflect a heckler’s veto as the idea of a 
heckler’s veto is often understood. But it is also clear that any such 
analysis is deeply contested even at the level of the federal appellate 
courts.133 The idea of a heckler’s veto, including its meaning, status, and 
scope, is here again fundamentally disputed. 
The meaning and scope of a heckler’s veto is even more 
conspicuously and essentially disputed in the context of public and pri-
vate university campuses. Arguable heckler’s veto cases in higher 
education contexts deserve separate attention. This Article attends to 
such cases immediately below. 
B. The University Speech Context 
Of late, the question of a heckler’s veto, at least as rather loosely 
defined, has arisen conspicuously on a number of public and private 
 
128. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
129. See id. at 493 (“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance 
of education to democratic society.”). 
130. Id. 
131. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.  
132. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27 (2015) (discussing when 
regulations on speech are considered content-based and are thus subject to strict 
scrutiny). 
133. See supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text. 
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university campuses. In such cases, the speaker may be either associated 
with the university in some capacity, or an outsider to the campus. One 
perspective on such cases, by University of California-Berkeley 
Chancellor Nicholas Dirks, illustrates one controversial dimension of the 
heckler’s veto policy conflict.134 Chancellor Dirks declares in particular 
that “[w]hile the school remains absolutely committed to ensuring that 
all points of view can be voiced and heard, we cannot compromise the 
physical safety of our students and guests in the process.”135 
It may be possible to reconcile these two apparently conflicting 
goals, but only through certain essentially and persistently controversial 
definitions and assumptions. In the apparently straightforward 
declaration by Professor Richard Epstein that “[w]henever speech 
inspires violence, it should be shut down.”136 This formulation requires 
a satisfactory account of what amounts to “inspiring”137 or perhaps di-
rectly inciting violence, and as well of what counts as sufficient 
‘violence’ in this context. The latter inquiry must consider whether the 
categories of speech and violence are themselves mutually exclusive. 
The broader point is that any view of any such matter is, in American 
culture, readily and sustainably contested. 
The university-speech context in general highlights a number of 
distinctive and intractable heckler’s veto problems. Should some in-
stances of de-platforming138 a potential speaker, disinviting a speaker, 
or non-platforming such a speaker at some earlier stage, count as the 
 
134. Nicholas Dirks, Berkeley Is Under Attack From Both Sides, N.Y. Times 
(Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/opinion/berkeley-is-
under-attack-from-both-sides.html [https://perma.cc/WZ76-QMF7]. 
135. Id. 
136. Richard A. Epstein, Mob Censorship on Campus, Hoover Institution 
(Mar. 13, 2017), www.hoover.org/research/mob-censorship-campus [https:// 
perma.cc/ZS7Z-3GN6]. See Nwanguma v. Trump, No. 3:16-cv-247-DJH, 2017 WL 
1234152, at *3 (W.D. KY Mar. 31, 2017) (seeking to link criminal incitement to 
the concepts of provoking, stirring up, persuading, specific advocacy, and either 
explicit or implicit encouragement; apparently endorsing a relatively broad 
understanding of incitement, even in a speech context). 
137. Epstein, supra note 136. See also supra note 33 and accompanying text.  
138. For background on the complex phenomenon of university speaker de-
platforming, and related analyses of controversial speakers, see, for example, 
Sarah Bell, NUS ‘Right to Have No Platform Policy’, BBC (Apr. 25, 2016), 
www.bbc.com/news/education-36101423 [https://perma.cc/S9WY-UJQ7] 
(noting the popularity among students of some such no-platform policies with 
regard to speaker access to student union premises). For example in the 
American context, see Aaron R. Hanlon, Why Colleges Have a Right to Reject 
Hateful Speakers Like Ann Coulter, New Republic (Apr. 24, 2017), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/142218/colleges-right-reject [https://perma. 
cc/68AA-MF9V] (discussing the logistical reality of inviting speakers to campus 
and the sometimes erroneous narrative of how and why dis-invitations occur). 
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exercise of an early stage heckler’s veto? Or are such cases instead mere 
unavoidable reflections of a necessary, and occasionally awkward,139 
multi-stage process of selection from a broad pool of potential campus 
speakers, not all of whom deserve legitimization140 by association with 
the university? Gatekeeping of university speakers on the basis of the 
perceived value of their earlier or anticipated speech seems inevitable. 
Thus it has been argued: 
No-platforming may look like censorship from certain angles, but 
from others it’s a consequence of a challenging, never-ending 
process occurring at virtually all levels of the university: deciding 
what educational material to present to our students and what to 
leave out. In this sense, de-platforming isn’t censorship; it’s a 
product of free expression and the foundational aims of a 
classically liberal education.141 
It is hardly surprising, given the variety of “angles”142 available, that 
the appropriateness of no-platforming and other forms of what some see 
as a complex, multistage, institutionalized heckler’s veto is contested. 
Nor is it possible to consensually resolve campus heckler’s veto cases 
by classifying some audience reactions to actual or potential speech, or 
to the speakers in question, as either reasonable and appropriate, or 
else as merely hypersensitive and therefore unworthy of official 
validation. Analogous battles have long been waged, inconclusively, in 
the Establishment Clause context over whether particular adverse 
reactions to religious speech in public places should be classified as 
 
139. A loosely parallel set of problems arise in the traditional public school library 
context, in which non-required library books may inevitably be ordered without 
meaningful scrutiny for appropriateness, and some thereafter removed as 
educationally unsuitable. See Bd. of Educ. Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. 
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870–72 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
140. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and 
Legitimation, 57 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 375, 377 (2006) (citing the 
understanding of legitimacy as a generalized belief “that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and definitions”); Cathryn Johnson et al., Legitimacy as 
a Social Process, 32 Ann. Rev. Soc. 53, 57 (2006) (discussing the social 
processes underlying the establishment of legitimacy). For a surprising 
argument linking the permissibility of explicitly bigoted speech to political 
legitimacy, see Ronald Dworkin, Even Bigots and Holocaust Deniers Must Have 
Their Say, The Guardian (Feb. 13, 2006), www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2006/Feb/14/muhammadcartoons.comment [https://perma.cc/VRJ7-
FEA3]. 
141. Hanlon, supra note 138. 
142. Id. 
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merely hypersensitive or excessive.143 We should expect no greater 
consensus in the campus speech context. 
A further dimension of inconclusiveness in the campus heckler’s 
veto cases involves the contested notion of “violence.” The basic 
problem here is that the scope of the idea of “violence” is not invariably 
confined to something like the direct application of physical force144 or 
the immediate threat thereof, whether by dominant groups or by sub-
ordinated groups and insurgents.145 Typologies of violence have in some 
cases incorporated ideas of structural, systemic, or symbolic violence, 
beyond the conspicuous, dramatic outbursts of sheer physical violence 
that more commonly seize public attention.146 
In the campus speech context in particular, the idea of discursive 
violence, or violence inflicted via speech, has clearly been raised.147 
Roughly, discursive violence may involve language that discounts or 
dismisses personal or group experiences and sensibilities, even when 
 
143. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 859 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(en banc) (Hamilton, J., concurring) (discussing the link between audience 
hypersensitivity with obtuseness and unreasonableness); Nurre v. Whitehead, 
580 F.3d 1087, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009) (Smith, J., concurring in the judgment and 
dissenting in part) (deploring presumed audience hypersensitivity); Books v. 
Elkhart Cty., 401 F.3d 857, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (purporting to distinguish “an 
objective, reasonable person standard” from “the standpoint of the 
hypersensitive or easily offended”) (citing, inter alia, Capitol Square Review & 
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring)); 
Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 165 (5th Cir. 1991) (Goldberg, J., 
dissenting) (“Only through sensitivity to the nonadherent can we effect the 
constitutional values inherent in the Religion Clauses. . . . Yet, by insisting that 
the test be an objective one—a ‘reasonable nonadherent’ test—the endorsement 
inquiry retains the ability to discount the perceptions of a hypersensitive 
plaintiff.”). For a series of doubts as to the value of references to ‘objectivity’ 
in this and many other legal contexts, see R. George Wright, Objective and 
Subjective Tests in the Law, 16 N.H. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017). 
144. See Hannah Arendt, On Violence 4 (1970) (distinguishing the idea of 
violence from the ideas of force and power). 
145. Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence 277 (T.E. Hulme & J. Roth 
trans., The Free Press 1950) (1919). 
146. See, e.g., Etienne Balibar, Violence and Civility: On the Limits of 
Political Philosophy 83 (2015); Richard J. Bernstein, Violence: 
Thinking Without Banisters 176–77 (2013) (distinguishing among legal, 
structural, symbolic, totalitarian, and physical violence); Slavoj Žižek, 
Violence: Six Sideways Reflections 1–2 (2008) (distinguishing subjective 
violence “embodied in language,” systemic violence exerted by “the smooth 
functioning of our economic and political systems,” and objective violence that 
is “invisible” in that it is incorporated into our baseline from which other forms of 
violence may be measured as a departure). 
147. See, e.g., Jade Schiff, Violence Requires Multiple Definitions, Oberlin Rev. 
(May 1, 2015), https://oberlinreview.org/8174/opinions/violence-requires-
multiple-definitions [https://perma.cc/AGW6-KCC6]. 
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those experiences and sensibilities may seem fundamental and well-
grounded in history and culture.148 Language, with no additional physi-
cal component, can clearly inflict meaningful injury.149 Thus words that 
are thought to deny fundamental core experiences—and thus to 
dehumanize—are said to pose a direct danger to vulnerable targets of 
the speech in question.150 On such a view, a heckler’s veto of such speech 
may, at worst, respond to one kind of violence with another. 
Of course, it is also possible to legally discount or dismiss target or 
audience responses to such dismissive speech.151 The resulting sustained 
debate re-inscribes the unresolved conflict over what should count as 
audience “hypersensitivity.”152 The status of discursive violence, to 
which a heckler’s veto, at some stage, might be a legitimate response, 
is clearly a continuing and unresolved debate. 
Thus on a broad understanding, “[t]o do violence is to carry out an 
intention to behave in a manner likely to cause harm.”153 Such a view 
is certainly not without respectable historical support. Consider the 
observations of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen,154 a well-respected 
 
148. See id. 
149. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Mari J. 
Matsuda et al., Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, 
Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment 1 (1993); Ulrich Baer, 
What ‘Snowflakes’ Get Right About Free Speech, N.Y. Times (Apr. 24, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/opinion/what-liberal-snowflakes-get-
right-about-free-speech.html?mcubz=1  [https://perma.cc/6YXV-5HSU]. 
150. See Jonathan Haidt, Intimidation Is the New Normal on Campus, Chron. 
Higher Educ. (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.dartblog.com/image/Intimid 
ation%20Is%20the%20New%20Normal%20--%20Jon%20Haidt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BTR9-3Q2B]. 
151. Id. 
152. See supra note 143. 
153. Barry L. Gan, Violence and Nonviolence: An Introduction 19 
(2013) (emphasis omitted). Note that this definition does not require that the 
speaker in question specifically intend the objectively likely harm. See also 
Lisa Feldman Barrett, When Is Speech Violence?, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/opinion/sunday/when-is-
speech-violence.html [https://perma.cc/K25A-9Z8X] (seeking to distinguish the 
adverse physical stress effects of abusive speech from those of merely offensive 
speech). But see, Jonathan Haidt & Greg Lukianoff, Why It’s a Bad Idea to 
Tell Students Words Are Violence, THE ATLANTIC (July 18, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/07/why-its-a-bad-idea-to-
tell-students-words-are-violence/533970 [https://perma.cc/4C2F-CFSV] (arguing 
that banning stress-inducing speakers from college campuses will not make 
students safer). 
154. James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity 121–22 
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1991) (1874). 
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Victorian critic of the free-speech theory of John Stuart Mill.155 
Fitzjames Stephen interestingly argues that treating someone’s opinions 
as false or denying the meaningfulness of such opinions “may cause 
intense pain, and this may be of many different kinds . . . .”156 In 
Fitzjames Stephen’s view, causing this intense pain is, crucially, an in-
fringement of that person’s own “liberty of thought.”157 
In sum, there is a sustained, undeniable lack of consensus on 
whether a heckler’s veto can be a legitimate policy response to speech 
that is itself thought to embody violence, or that itself restricts in some 
measure the freedom of thought of the targets of such speech. Here 
again, there will be no voluntary consensus.158 
Someone might be tempted to say, though, that at least if society 
could somehow set all these controversies aside, any heckler’s veto of 
any controversial campus speaker, and any associated intimidation or 
deterrence of speech, must necessarily diminish the institution of free 
speech overall. This may seem intuitively clear, if not true merely by 
definition. 
However, even this view is easily and persistently contested. 
Especially in the case of reasonably well-known outside speakers, one 
or more exercises of a heckler’s veto typically does not meaningfully 
restrict the speaker’s realistic ability to convey their ideas to any rele-
vant audience. Most, if not all, such speakers will retain perfectly 
adequate alternative channels, including social media, through which to 
convey their message to any interested persons.159 And in some cases, 
the publicity associated with the presumed heckler’s veto will clearly 
 
155. See generally John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 
Penguin Books 1974) (1859). 
156. Stephens, supra note 154, at 121. 
157. Id. at 121–22. 
158. In the context of at least some forms of pain, fear, and violence, see Robert M. 
Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1629 (1986) (“[A]s long as 
legal interpretation is constitutive of violent behavior as well as meaning, as 
long as people are committed to using or resisting the social organizations of 
violence in making their interpretations real, there will always be a tragic limit 
to the common meaning that can be achieved.”). 
159. See, e.g., Hanlon, supra note 138 (stating that “[o]bviously, students can read, 
watch, and hear professional provocateurs like [Ann] Coulter without an 
institution of higher education hosting her speech); Baer, supra note 149 
(“Universities invite speakers not chiefly to present otherwise unavailable 
discoveries, but to present to the public views they have presented elsewhere.”). 
For a broad discussion of why judicial review of free speech cases should consider 
the value of the speakers options to disseminate their message before and after 
the regulation on speech, see R. George Wright, The Unnecessary Complexity 
of Free Speech Law and the Central Importance of Alternative Speech 
Channels, 9 Pace L. Rev. 57 (1989). 
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draw increased public attention, over time, to the speaker or the 
message at issue.160 It is thus entirely contestable whether the university 
campus heckler’s veto must necessarily result in overall damage to the 
institution of free speech, even if the speech rights of those targeted by 
the speech in question are set aside. 
Conclusion 
Reluctance to let a speaker’s opponents suppress the speech in 
question directly or indirectly through their own violence seems to be 
reflected in the law. American society seems in particular to be reluc-
tant to encourage or to incentivize161 violence in the place of dialogue. 
But as shown in the classic Supreme Court cases,162 and in more recent 
appellate case law in the contexts of public school education163 and 
university campus speech,164 Americans continue to be far from 
agreement on most of the interesting elements of definition, scope, and 
value in purported heckler’s veto cases. 
This may seem a curious state of affairs. After all, there is nothing 
finally at stake or ultimately decided merely in how the idea of a 
heckler’s veto is defined, or other preliminary issues. Why can’t the 
adherents of the more fundamental substantive legal or political doc-
trines involved stipulate to any reasonable understanding of the 
meaning of a heckler’s veto, and then argue, on that reasonable basis, 
the substantive merits of their political or legal positions? It seems 
 
160. See Hanlon, supra note 138. Presumably most instances in which persons feel 
intimidated from speaking candidly have little to do with any form of a heckler’s 
veto as discussed above. In any event there is also the counter-balancing 
possibility that a heckler’s veto could be used disproportionately against those 
lacking the institutional political strength to defend their basic interests. See, 
e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, Words Which By Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury, 
Atlantic (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2017/04/words-which-by-their-very-utterance-inflict-injury/523344/ 
[https://perma.cc/5PWV-8ESY]. 
161. It is thought that some approaches to the disruption of speech incentivize 
disruptive violence, and in effect provide a legal roadmap of how to silence 
disfavored speakers. See, e.g., Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 274 
(6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Rogers, J., dissenting). It is, however, equally 
arguable that more broadly protecting speech against a heckler’s veto provides 
a corresponding legal roadmap to engaging in harmful, assaultive, or in some 
sense itself violent speech. See supra notes 149–158 and accompanying text 
(discussing that speech, even without conduct, can inflict harm); Collin v. 
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding city ordinances unconstitutional 
in the historic Illinois Nazi demonstration case). 
162. See supra Section II. 
163. See supra Section III.A. 
164. See supra Section III.B.  
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implausible to suppose that in the case of every legal concept, the bare 
definition of the concept decisively steers, if it does not actually dictate, 
case outcomes on the merits. 
The full explanation for the various ongoing conceptual struggles 
over the scope, status, and meaning of a heckler’s veto, doubtlessly 
includes various inseparable causal strands.165 But it is worth calling 
attention to what seems to be one increasingly important cultural 
circumstance. This circumstance is, specifically, a general and continu-
ing loss of confidence in our ability, as advocates of whatever legal or 
political position may be at stake, to reasonably persuade our 
opponents, or to convince those opponents of our substantive views on 
the merits. Let us call this general phenomenon reduced forensic confi-
dence. 
Given that reduced forensic confidence, this country cannot afford 
to settle for any understanding of the very idea of a heckler’s veto that 
does not make one’s persuasive task relatively easy, and an opponent’s 
persuasive task correspondingly more difficult. We distinctively tend to 
lack confidence that from any reasonable preliminary understanding of 
the idea of a heckler’s veto, the truth or rightness of our own preferred 
policy outcomes will gradually emerge and be widely recognized and 
appreciated. 
The explanation, in turn, for this widespread contemporary loss of 
forensic confidence is also doubtless multi-faceted, and beyond any 
rigorous proof. Speculatively, though, a number of specific contem-
porary circumstances may play a role in the general loss of forensic 
confidence in question. 
In particular, in an increasingly intensely polarized and mutually 
embittered legal and political culture,166 resistance to one’s own views 
may be more determined and implacable than it otherwise might be. 
Even if differences as to what should count as a heckler’s veto are in 
some sense preliminary, there is no guarantee that such differences will 
 
165. See Jim Manzi, What Social Science Does—and Doesn’t—Know, City J., 
https://www.city-journal.org/html/what-social-science-does%E2%80%94and- 
doesn%E2%80%99t%E2%80%94know-13297.html [https://perma.cc/6GQU- 
DKLJ] (last visited Oct. 10, 2017). 
166. See, e.g., Emily Badger & Niraj Chokshi, How We Became Bitter Political 
Enemies, N.Y. Times (June 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/06/15/upshot/how-we-became-bitter-political-enemies.html?mcubz=1 
[https://perma.cc/W6RP-K3MH] (identifying trends of increasing political 
polarization); see generally Jean M. Twenge, et al., More Polarized but More 
Independent: Political Party Identification and Ideological Self-Categorization 
Among U.S Adults, College Students, and Late Adolescents, 1970-2015, 42 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1364 (2016) (identifying a correlation 
between early party-identification amongst Millennials and more extreme 
ideological self-categorization); Bill Bishop, The Big Sort: Why The 
Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart (2009). 
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not be magnified, maintained, and exploited to any length by the 
partisans involved.167 In matters of law and politics, even apparently 
minor or preliminary matters may increasingly seem to be ideologically 
inseparable from other, more substantive issues,168 thereby raising the 
stakes and the risks in every context. To make even a reasonable 
concession as to the bare meaning or the contextual scope of a heckler’s 
veto may—under the circumstances of America’s increasingly intensely 
polarized politics—appear to leave one at a perhaps permanent 
disadvantage. Even if someone believes that history is ultimately on his 
or her side,169 that person can hardly be confident that history will in-
volve no painful or disturbing detours or reversals.170 
A sense that the stakes, in a given context, have increased, can 
under some circumstances clearly promote a reduced level of confidence 
in a favorable outcome. Consider, by loose analogy, a hypothetical 
parent’s confidence that their child is in the fenced backyard. The 
parent may be subjectively confident of the child’s current presence 
based on only limited evidence. Now suppose the parent now hears a 
report of coyotes in the neighborhood. The report naturally raises the 
parent’s level of concern for the child’s safety. Interestingly, such 
anxiety-provoking news might also by itself tend to reduce the parent’s 
subjective confidence that the child is, in fact, in the fenced backyard. 
More directly, though, a reduced confidence in one’s ability to 
persuade one’s legal and political opponents, from any reasonable 
starting point, may reflect an entirely justified sense that current debate 
on legal and political matters commonly tends to be disappointing or 
unsatisfactory in its quality. Advocates’ confidence in the cogency and 
effectiveness of their arguments may even be limited by a vague sense 
that those arguments could somehow be better presented and defended. 
 
167. See Anton Blok, The Narcissism of Minor Differences, 1 Eur. J. Soc. 
Theory 33, 33 (1998). 
168. This is a matter of increased ideological awareness and attempts at ideological 
consistency. For recent trends, see Political Polarization in the American 
Public: How Increasing Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect 
Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life, Pew Res. Ctr. 1 (June 12, 2014), 
http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/06/6-12-2014-Political-Polarization-
Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2KW-MFVV].  
169. Despite the idea’s apparently deep metaphysical commitments, it is often thought 
that the universe is somehow oriented toward some presumably valid 
understanding of justice. See The Arc of the Moral Universe Is Long, But It Bends 
Toward Justice, Quote Investigator http://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/11/ 
15/arc-of-universe [https://perma.cc/9ND4-KESD] (last visited Oct. 19, 2017). 
170. That any bending toward real justice need not be continuous and uninterrupted 
is confirmed as much by our history as by the logic of the concepts involved. 
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More typically, though, there is an increasing sense that one’s oppo-
nents are, for one reason or another, not fully in a position to appreciate 
the cogency of one’s arguments.171 
That one’s opponents are sufficiently empathetic, self-critical, 
practically wise, and also sufficiently well versed in history, culture, 
economics, logic, probability, and statistics to properly appreciate one’s 
argument, in the heckler’s veto area or otherwise, will often seem doubt-
ful. Civic ignorance is today often thought to be pervasive and 
conspicuous.172 Sufficient cultural competence or cultural literacy,173 and 
critical-thinking-ability sufficient to follow and genuinely appreciate a 
controversial argument,174 are also clearly not to be taken for granted.175 
 
171. In somewhat formal terms, we may decreasingly recognize our political 
antagonists as our genuine epistemic peers. See, e.g., Bryan Frances, 
Disagreement 47–48 (2014) (defining epistemic peerhood); Nathan L. King, 
Disagreement: What’s the Problem?, or A Good Peer Is Hard to Find, 85 Phil. 
& Phenomenological Res. 249, 251-53 (2012); R George Wright, Epistemic 
Peerhood in the Law, 91 St. John’s L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017). 
172. See generally Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance (2d 
ed. 2016) (pointing out that not all political ignorance, however otherwise 
dismaying, need be narrowly irrational). See also Karoli Kuns, Justice David 
Souter On Civic Ignorance: ‘That Is How Democracy Dies’, (Oct. 22, 2016, 
5:00 AM), Crooks & Liars, http://crooksandliars.com/2016/10/justice-
david-souter-civic-ignorance-how [https://perma.cc/HWV4-4LQ3]; Reid Wilson, 
Only 36 Percent of Americans Can Name the Three Branches of Government, 
Wash. Post (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
govbeat/wp/2014/09/18/only-36-percent-of-americans-can-name-the-
three-branches-of-government/?utm_term=.33313a3c9572 [https://perma. 
cc/4RJH-T2EE]. 
173. See, e.g., Shalina Chatlani, Are Modern Standards Breeding a Decline in Cultural 
Literacy?, Educ. Dive (June 30, 2016), http://www.educationdive.com/news/ 
are-modern-standards-breeding-a-decline-in-cultural-literacy/421401/ [https:// 
perma.cc/9MXY-CHS3]. See generally E.D. Hirsch, Why Knowledge 
Matters: Rescuing Our Children From Failed Educational 
Theories (2016). We set aside any possible effects of the rise to prominence of 
what we might call short-form communications technologies. 
174. See generally Richard Arum & Josipa Roksa, Academically Adrift: 
Limited Learning on College Campuses 1 (2011); Douglas Belkin, 
Exclusive Test Data: Many Colleges Fail to Improve Critical-Thinking Skills, 
Wall St. J. (June 5, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/exclusive-test-
data-many-colleges-fail-to-improve-critical-thinking-skills-1496686662  
[https://perma.cc/RB9V-47YQ]. Even at the most elite levels, there are 
conspicuous problems of systematic cognitive and ego-defensive biases and a 
more general inability to exercise reasonable practical judgment. See, e.g., 
Chris Hayes, Twilight of the Elites: America After Meritocracy 
(2012); Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (rev. 
ed., 1993) (1936). 
175. More speculatively, it may also be that many of us vaguely sense that however 
intense or unshakeable of our basic political or legal beliefs, no ultimately rock-
solid foundations are available to undergird or validate those beliefs. See the 
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These considerations suggest that only a limited degree of confi-
dence in the ability to reasonably persuade interlocutors from any 
reasonably fair starting point is appropriate. Together, this translates 
into an understandable lack of confidence in reasoned political and legal 
argumentation, in the heckler’s veto context and elsewhere. 
Under these circumstances, it is understandable that advocates 
would be reluctant to make concessions even as to the status, meaning, 
and scope of the heckler’s veto doctrine. Nor should we expect any 
greater forensic confidence, or any greater willingness to make even 
preliminary, reasonable concessions, until the grounds for the current 
lack of such confidence have dissipated. 
 
 
variety of more or less unambitious meta-ethical programs discussed in, for 
example, Andrew Fisher, Metaethics: An Introduction (2014); Mark 
van Roojen, Metaethics: A Contemporary Introduction (2015). For 
a more specific discussion, see, for example, Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics 
and Language (1944) (referring to ethics discussions as an ultimate matter 
of emotivist appeals to approve or disapprove what the speaker approves or 
disapproves). This may in some perhaps subconscious way further limit our 
confidence in our ability to reasonably persuade others. 
